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Defaulting the Purpose
THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING IN THE WAKE OF
ARGENTINA’S DEBT CRISIS
“They don’t call it sovereign debt for nothing.”1
INTRODUCTION
The Second Circuit’s ruling in NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, a case in which wealthy creditors sued
Argentina under New York law for the repayment of defaulted
debt bonds, sought to prevent Argentina from paying back
creditors that accepted restructured bonds unless Argentina also
paid back holdout bondholders equally.2 This decision was the
subject of much criticism and scholarly debate because it was one
of the first instances of a court granting specific performance
based on a pari passu, or equal footing, clause.3 While the court
hoped that the creative relief would pressure Argentina to pay
back both restructured and holdout bondholders alike, it now
seems that the decision was counterproductive.
Argentina successfully skirted the court’s injunctions and
escaped paying back the holdout bondholders by defaulting on its
debt and relinquishing all responsibility for repayment, but at the
cost of plunging the country into another economic crisis.4
Argentina has made it abundantly clear that it will stop at
nothing in order to continue repayments to those bondholders
that cooperated with Argentina’s debt restructuring, despite U.S.

1 Dan Rosenheck, Argentina’s Rational Default, NEW YORKER (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/argentinas-rational-default [http://perma.cc/
3GLT-DXF5].
2 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012).
3 See, e.g., Jack Jrada, Closing the Book on Argentina’s Sovereign Debt Default:
The Second Circuit’s Decision and its Ramifications for Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the
Eurozone, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 222, 232 (2013); Brett Neve, NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina: An Alternative to the Inadequate Remedies under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 631, 657-60 (2014).
4 Jon Hartley, Argentina’s Default: Lessons Learned, What Happens Next,
FORBES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2014/08/04/argentinasdefault-lessons-learned-and-what-happens-next/ [http://perma.cc/75BH-VWNF].
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injunctions ordering the country to refrain from doing so.5
Argentina has defied court orders, enacted legislation to avoid
New York intermediary banks, and continued to deposit funds for
restructured bondholders.6 As a result, Argentina has established
a model for other nations seeking to avoid their international
creditors by making debt restructuring impossible.7
Governments borrow substantial capital by issuing debt in
the form of sovereign bonds.8 A debt restructuring allows a
distressed debtor to minimize costs and restore economic growth
by changing the terms of the bonds.9 The terms that are changed
in a restructuring vary, but the two most commonly used are debt
rescheduling, which involves lengthening the maturity date of the
old debt, and debt reduction, which involves reducing the face
value of the original debt.10 Restructuring agreements are crucial
in facilitating recovery when a nation can no longer afford to pay
the full amount of its debt.11 When certain bondholders “hold out,”
or refrain from accepting the terms of the restructured debt, not
only is the restructuring process frustrated, but it becomes nearly
impossible for the sovereign to settle its debt.12 In some cases, the
sovereign will be forced to default on its debt in order to maintain
domestic stability.13 As Argentina’s default shows, however, under
the current international system, a sovereign can also choose to
default for strategic reasons.14
Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt on July 31, 2014,
marking its second default since 2001.15 The defaulted bonds
had been the issue of litigation for over a decade, and this most
5 Ken Parks & Taos Turner, Argentina Moves to Pay Exchange Bondholders
in Argentina, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2014, 10:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/frontiers/
2014/08/20/argentina-moves-to-pay-exchange-bondholders-in-argentina/tab/print/
[http://perma.cc/6XAP-X3RD].
6 Nicole Hong, Bondholders Not Optimistic About Argentina’s New Scheme,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:21 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/08/20/
bondholders-not-optimistic-about-argentinas-new-scheme/ [http://perma.cc/PG7H-JVXT].
7 Laura Alfaro, To Pay or Not to Pay: Argentina and the International Debt
Market, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 25, 2014), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/
item/to-pay-or-not-to-pay-argentina-and-the-international-debt-market [http://perma.cc/
BGB8-BJKU].
8 Robert Auray, In Bonds We Trustee: A New Contractual Mechanism to
Improve Sovereign Bond Restructurings, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 899, 903 (2013).
9 JOSE M. GARRIDO, OUT-OF-COURT DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1 (2012).
10 Auray, supra note 8, at 903-04.
11 GARRIDO, supra note 9, at 1.
12 Jrada, supra note 3, at 223-25.
13 Id.; Nicola Gennaioli, Alberto Martin & Stefano Rossi, Sovereign Default,
Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions 12-13 (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7955
2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658282 [http://perma.cc/HN3Y-G5VR].
14 See Rosenheck, supra note 1 (predicting that Argentina’s 2014 default was
based on strategy, and not financial instability, since Argentina had access to steady
cash flow and a timely interest repayment schedule at the time of default).
15 Hartley, supra note 4.
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recent default brings about new issues in international debt
restructuring and problems with holdout litigation.16 Since the
2001 default, Argentina has been unable to secure the
investors and lenders needed to get the economy back on its
feet.17 Argentina has instead relied on government interference
in the private sector, manipulation of inflation reporting, and
the printing of central bank money to maintain reserves.18 The
litigation surrounding its first default has prevented Argentina
from re-entering the international debt market for the past 13
years, forcing it to sell local-law bonds—issued domestically
under Argentine law—and incur an additional $20 billion in
debt.19 Price freezes and volatile exchange rates have made it
increasingly difficult for private Argentine companies to cover
their operating costs, putting many out of business.20
Meanwhile, the Argentine peso has continued to fall in the
informal (black) market, making its devaluation a likely
possibility.21 Argentina’s default and ensuing economic policies
have cost Argentina’s lenders an estimated $74 billion, imposed
more than $24 billion in revenue costs on taxpayers worldwide,
and reduced the value of direct investments in Argentina by
another $39 billion.22
Additionally, the NML Capital decision has reinforced
the rights of holdout creditors to frustrate restructuring efforts
worldwide, which creates an unsustainable framework for
foreign sovereign debt management. Foreign debt litigation has
in effect become “a chess match: a move by a vulture is blocked
or countered, and a new move or theory comes into vogue as

Neve, supra note 3, at 631-32.
Id.
18 Announcement: Moody’s: Limited Market Access and Low Growth Will
Pressure Argentina’s Next Administration to Adjust Policies, MOODY’S (Aug. 11, 2015),
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Limited-market-access-and-low-growth-willpressure-Argentinas-PR_332306 [http://perma.cc/2C66-J378].
19 Katia Porzecanski & Camila Russo, Argentina’s Griesa-Proof Bondholders
Unfazed by Sale Halt, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 5, 2015, 12:22 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-05/griesa-proof-bondholders-unfazedby-sale-halt-argentina-credit [http://perma.cc/NS4X-YWJY].
20 MOODY’S, supra note 18.
21 Pan Kwan Yuk & Benedict Mander, US Cleaning Company Clorox Warns
of Argentine Devaluation, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015, 8:28 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/3c2d3814-3a10-11e5-bbd1-b37bc06f590c.html#axzz3tx1rOHH5 [http://perma.cc/9K
AN-MXDS].
22 ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & NAM D. PHAM, DISCREDITED—THE IMPACT OF
ARGENTINA’S SOVEREIGN DEBT DEFAULT AND DEBT RESTRUCTURING ON U.S. TAXPAYERS
AND INVESTORS 24 (Oct. 2006), http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/argentina_1006.pdf
[http://perma.cc/56JR-AHSJ].
16

17
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another avenue to try to increase the chances of recovery.”23
Incentivizing creditors to hold out will cause restructuring to
become more complicated and time consuming, which will in
turn prolong economic hardship.24 Continued debt crises result
not only in economic harm, but also in social and humanitarian
disaster, such as severe cuts to social services and increased
rates of unemployment, homelessness, and crime.25 Thus, this
is a particularly important time to consider novel solutions to
restructuring given the catastrophic consequences brought on
by Argentina’s recent default and the litigation it provoked.
An exploration of the implications of the NML Capital
decision and Argentina’s resulting default is essential in
considering a sustainable global framework for future disputes
between sovereign creditors and sovereign debtors. Part I of this
note describes the issues for sovereign debt restructuring caused
by holdout litigation. Part II explains the three main scholarly
proposals for ameliorating holdout litigation in foreign debt
restructuring and ultimately concludes that all three are
inadequate in isolation. Part III proposes an international
restructuring court to enforce an international restructuring
code as a solution to the problem of unsuccessful sovereign debt
restructuring. This international restructuring regime would
combine elements of the three previous proposals in a new way
and would be best equipped to solve the seemingly unsolvable
problem of restructuring sovereign debt after the recent
Argentine saga. Ultimately, this hybrid solution would prevent
holdout litigation on existing debt while also establishing an
efficient and functional framework for restructuring future debt
and protecting other sovereign nations from the pitfalls of the
Argentine approach.
I.

THE ARGENTINE DEBT SAGA

Argentina’s current debt problems began in the early
1990s, around the time the country started to issue sovereign
bonds under a Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA).26 In 1991, the
23 Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign
Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 47, 61 (2010).
24 TIAGO STICHELMANS, EURODAD, WHY A UNITED NATIONS SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK IS KEY TO IMPLEMENTING THE POST-2015 SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 9 (2015), http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/557aadc402bec.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JNY3-HUNF].
25 Id. at 7-8.
26 Arturo C. Porzecanski, The Origins of Argentina’s Litigation and
Arbitration Saga, 2002-2014, at 15 (Am. U. Sch. of Int’l Service, Working Paper No.
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Argentine peso was pegged to the U.S. dollar, meaning that the
exchange rate was the same for both pesos and dollars, as part of
a plan to attract foreign investment and end high rates of
inflation.27 Despite this effort, Argentina’s national debt continued
to grow as the value of exports decreased, and Argentine debt was
downgraded twice by 2001.28 During the recession leading up to
2001, Argentina’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) continued to
decrease while the debt burden continued to increase, and
hyperinflation rose to new highs.29 This caused innumerable
withdrawals of money from the market, triggering a Presidential
Decree that limited further withdrawals in order to prevent a
bank run.30 Riots erupted against the regime responsible for the
decree, causing political chaos that involved the transition of five
interim presidents in just two weeks.31 Subsequently, the
Argentine peso plunged in value, causing Argentina to sever
previous debt negotiations with the Intentional Monetary Fund
(IMF).32 This forced Argentina to default on its international debt
obligations in 2001.33
A.

The Beginning of the Endless Debt Battle

As a result of the default and ensuing economic crisis, the
new Argentine President declared a “temporary moratorium” that
prevented payments to all bondholders.34 In an effort to recuperate
from the default and successfully reengage in the international
market, Argentina began to negotiate restructuring terms with
bondholders in 2005.35 Seventy-six percent of the original bonds
were exchanged in the 2005 restructuring, which gave bondholders
the option to exchange their original bonds for new restructured
2015-6, 2015), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 276267255 [http://perma.cc/F5SYK2SL]; Jrada, supra note 3, at 222.
27 Samuel Maynard & Alexandria Todd, Note, Chaos, Pure and Simple:
Examining the Complexities of the 2001 Economic Crisis in Argentina, 15 J. INT’L REL. 150,
152 (2013); Matt O’Brien, Everything You Need to Know About Argentina’s Weird Default,
WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/20
14/08/03/everything-you-need-to-know-about-argentinas-weird-default/
[http://perma.cc/
4CBY-RMQ3].
28 Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Expedited Debt Restructuring Under Argentine
Law: Acuerdo Preventivo Extrajudicial (APE), in EXPEDITED DEBT RESTRUCTURING: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 19, 22 (Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal ed., 2007);
O’Brien, supra note 27.
29 Maynard & Todd, supra note 27, at 154; SHAPIRO & PHAM, supra note 22, at 8.
30 Olivares-Caminal, supra note 28, at 22; O’Brien, supra note 27.
31 Maynard & Todd, supra note 27, at 154; SHAPIRO & PHAM, supra note 22, at 8.
32 Id. at 154.
33 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir.
2012); Neve, supra note 3, at 631.
34 See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 251; Neve, supra note 3, at 634.
35 See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 252; Neve, supra note 3, at 634.

274

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

bonds worth about 29 cents to every dollar owed on the original
bonds.36 Argentina also passed the Lock Law in 2005, making it
illegal for the Argentine government to repay or settle with any
bondholder who did not agree to the restructurings.37
The second restructuring in 2010 brought participating
bonds up to roughly 91% of Argentina’s total debt.38 The
creditors that refused to accept restructured bonds—labeled
holdouts or vulture funds—were left free to seek enforcement
for full repayment on their original bonds. Argentina made it
clear, however, that it had no intention of repaying these
holdout creditors.39 While Argentina continued to make all
payments due on the restructured bonds, it refused to pay the
holdouts anything at all.40
The conflict between these holdout vulture funds and
Argentina has since prompted more than a decade of litigation.41
This subset of bondholders are labeled “vulture funds” because
they (usually wealthy American investors) strategically buy
sovereign debt at extreme discounts when the country is
distressed and close to default in order to sue the sovereign later
for the full value of the original bond.42 Five vulture funds—the
“Gang of Five”—began to seek full repayment on the defaulted
Argentine bonds: NML Capital (the subsidiary of Paul Signer’s
Elliot Management), Aurelius Capital, Blue Angel Capital,
Oliphant, and a small group of retail investors.43 NML Capital
has also pursued a variety of other avenues to force Argentina
into full repayment, including chasing the country’s assets around
the world. In 2012, NML Capital even won a favorable verdict in
Ghana that allowed the country to seize and detain an Argentine
navy ship.44 Tensions continued to escalate as the “Gang of Five”45
Neve, supra note 3, at 634-35; SHAPIRO & PHAM, supra note 22, at 14.
Neve, supra note 3, at 634-35.
38 Porzecanski, supra note 26, at 17; Neve, supra note 3, at 635.
39 Hilary Burke, What Argentina’s Fight with Holdout Creditors Is All About,
REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2013, 4:33 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/22/ukargentina-debt-idUSLNE91L00B20130222 [http://perma.cc/4NQ6-JSGJ].
40 See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 252-53; Neve, supra note 3, at 635.
41 See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014);
NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 246; Lightwater Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 02 Civ.
3804, 2003 WL 1878420 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003).
42 Jrada, supra note 3, at 227.
43 Sheelah Kolhatkar, A New Twist in the Argentine Debt Saga, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-10-28/a-surpriseappearance-in-the-argentine-debt-drama [http://perma.cc/H5T8-8UQ9]. See generally
NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 246 (affirming permanent injunctions preventing Argentina
from continuing payments to restructured bondholders unless it made ratable
payments to holdouts).
44 Jamila Trindle, Argentine Default Bad Test Case for Sovereign Debt
Negotiations, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/
36

37
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brought suit in the Southern District of New York, requesting
injunctive relief for an alleged breach of contract.46
Argentina consented to jurisdiction in New York City by
an express provision in the FAA bonds stating that the bonds
are governed by the laws of New York and are subject to any
state or federal court in New York City.47 The FAA terms and
conditions included in the bonds contained a pari passu clause,
which guarantees bondholders that all claims would be ranked
equally with all “other present and future . . . [e]xternal
[i]ndebtedness.”48 Although this clause has been traditionally
inserted into bond contracts as a boilerplate provision, the
plaintiffs argued that the pari passu clause prevented Argentina
from making scheduled payments to restructured bondholders
without also making payments to the holdouts.49 The main
thrust of the plaintiffs’ argument was that Argentina violated
this provision in the FAA bonds when it made payments to the
restructured bondholders while refusing to pay the obligations
under the original holdout bonds. The plaintiffs also argued that
Argentina further violated this provision when it enacted the
Lock Law, which outlawed payment or negotiation with
bondholders that refused to restructure.50
Despite Argentina’s urgings that the broad scope of the
injunctions sought by the Gang of Five would infringe upon its
sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) by effectively preventing it from using its own assets
outside of the United States, Judge Thomas Griesa granted an
unusually broad equitable remedy by ordering Argentina to pay
holdout bondholders any time it pays restructured bondholders.51
NML Capital won suit in the district court against Argentina on
the defaulted FAA bonds, and Argentina subsequently appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.52
On appeal, Argentina argued, among other things, that it
had not violated the pari passu clause because it had not legally
subordinated the FAA bondholders to the exchange bondholders,
which it argued was required by the clause in order for the
25/argentina_default_bond_vulture_hedge_fund_sovereign_debt_grenada [http://perma.cc/
Z7QF-BTPF].
45 Kolhatkar, supra note 43.
46 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 2541 (TPG), 2009
U.S. Dist. Lexis 19046 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2009).
47 Id. at *2-3.
48 Jrada, supra note 3, at 223 (quoting NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 251).
49 Id.
50 Neve, supra note 3, at 637.
51 NML Capital, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19046, at *6; Neve, supra note 3, at 637.
52 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012).
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provision to be legally enforceable.53 The court stated that it was
“unpersuaded” by Argentina’s interpretation of the pari passu
clause as a “well settled” protection against the legal ranking of
bonds.54 Additionally, the court did not give merit to Argentina’s
contention that the injunctions violated its immunity under the
FSIA because, the court said, the injunctions did not constitute
formal attachment, arrest, or execution, as is required for FSIA
immunity.55 The court similarly set aside arguments that any
injunction would cause extreme hardship to the exchange
bondholders and lead to another economic crisis in Argentina.56
Ultimately, the Second Circuit upheld the imposition of
the injunctions but remanded for clarification of the broad scope
of the injunctions.57 On remand, the district court amended the
injunctions and clarified that although Argentina was the only
party previously bound by the injunctions, the injunctions now
also prevented third parties from assisting Argentina in evading
the injunctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d),
which defines the scope of every injunction.58
Argentina again appealed the district court’s decision and
was joined by nonparty appellants and intervenors.59 These other
groups included exchange bondholders and the Bank of New York
Mellon (BNY Mellon).60 As the indenture trustee to the exchange
bondholders,61 BNY Mellon was the appointed agent responsible
for acting on behalf of all of the bondholders.62 After the close of
oral argument, the court allowed Argentina to recommend a new
payment schedule for the bonds.63 But instead of recommending a
new schedule, Argentina first refused to settle or make payments
to the holdout litigators and then proposed a new and separate

Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 258.
55 Id. at 262.
56 Id. at 263.
57 Id. at 258-65.
58 See generally NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978
(TPG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168292 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012) (ordering third parties
to refrain from making interest payments to exchange bondholders unless Argentina
certifies that it is making equal payments to all bondholders). See also FED. R. CIV. P.
65(d). Specifically, under Rule 65(d)(2), injunctions bind all persons who are “in active
concert or participation with” either “the parties” or “the parties’ officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys.” Id.
59 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 237-39 (2d Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma
of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2008).
63 NML Capital, 727 F.3d at 238.
53
54
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issuance of substitute bonds and stated that it “would not
voluntarily obey” the district court’s decisions.64
The court affirmed the injunctions but granted a stay on
their enforcement until after the resolution of a timely appeal to
the Supreme Court.65 The Supreme Court denied certiorari,66 but
the legal battle did not stop there. To the contrary, the final judicial
decision against Argentina marked only the start of the country’s
problems with its debt negotiation and the serious implications for
the future of foreign debt restructuring.
B.

The Battle Between Vultures and Bargainers

The NML Capital decision has been the source of much
criticism, and many predict that it will have a crippling effect on
future foreign sovereign debt restructuring.67 The first criticism of
the decision argues that the district court used an extremely
expansive interpretation of the pari passu clause, which was only
inserted by Argentina as a final attempt to encourage creditor
participation in the face of economic crisis.68 Argentina argued that,
in the context of sovereign debt litigation, the pari passu clause had
been widely accepted as a limitation on the legal subordination of
debt only.69 Thus, the court’s interpretation of Argentina’s conduct
as a breach of the pari passu clause left the door open for an
increase in litigation for alleged breaches of these clauses.
The second main criticism of NML Capital is that the
injunctions issued by the district court are unjust and
unenforceable.70 The very idea of mandating a sovereign nation to
comply with another sovereign’s court impinges on the freedom of
the enjoined sovereign.71 Therefore, an enjoined nation will often
be outraged at an injunction of this type, causing it to defy the
enjoining court and ultimately preventing any significant
compliance.72 More importantly, courts are incapable of imposing
Id.
Id.
66 Exch. Bondholder Grp. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (mem.).
67 John
A. E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout:
International Certification Boards for Sovereign-Debt Restructurings, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J.
221, 230-32 (2014).
68 Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu:
That is the Question in Sovereign Bonds after the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga,
15 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 745, 766 (2009).
69 Id. at 768-69.
70 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt after NML v. Argentina 2, 12 (UNC
Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 2199655, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2199655
[http://perma.cc/B3DP-S6BB]; W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in
Sovereign Debt Litigation, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 189, 190 (2014).
71 Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 70, at 190.
72 Id. at 200.
64
65
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effective contempt sanctions, attaching or seizing property of the
sovereign, or forcing the sovereign to pay certain creditors.73 This
is primarily because most sovereign assets are immune from
attachment and execution under the FSIA.74 The consequences of
the NML Capital decision are a perfect example of the
ineffectiveness of granting injunctions in cases involving foreign
debt restructurings.
After the Supreme Court declined to hear NML Capital,
the district court appointed a mediator to oversee negotiations
between the parties. But Argentina continuously refused to
cooperate with both direct and indirect attempts at negotiation.75
Argentina recognized that the injunctions could not be enforced
in any direct way because of its immunity to foreign seizure of
assets and began to plot a way to get around the rulings.76
Argentina’s first move was to deposit $539 million with trustee
bank BNY Mellon in order to pay exchanged bondholders by
July 31, 2014.77
In doing so, Argentina relied on a provision included in
most of their bonds stating that the obligation to make a
payment is fulfilled once the money is delivered to the trustee.78
This put BNY Mellon in the hot seat, facing possible sanctions
from the district court if it aided Argentina in paying exchanged
bondholders without also paying holdouts equally.79 On the flip
side, Argentina also threatened to sue BNY Mellon for breaching
its relationship as trustee to the exchange bondholders by
withholding payment.80 Faced with a lose-lose situation, BNY

Id. at 190.
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1967, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
75 Taos Turner, Hedge Fund Says Argentina Not Working to Negotiate Deal
in Dispute, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2014, 10:08 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/
representatives-from-argentina-hedge-funds-meet-with-court-appointed-mediator-14
05119797 [http://perma.cc/C3N5-DA33] [hereinafter Turner, Hedge Fund].
76 Hong, supra note 6.
77 Daniel Bases, BNY Mellon to U.S. Judge: What Should We Do with
Argentina’s Money?, REUTERS (July 2, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/201407-02/business/sns-rt-us-argentina-debt-bnymellon-20140702_1_bny-mellon-u-s-judgethomas-griesa-aurelius-capital-management [http://perma.cc/F45P-SXFU].
78 Sheelah Kolhatkar, Argentina’s Secret Plan to Escape Default, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-08-04/argentinas-planto-escape-default-is-hidden-in-the-fine-print [http://perma.cc/5HBB-TU24].
79 Alexandra Stevenson, Hedge Fund Sues to Get Argentine Bond Payment
in London, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014, 7:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/
08/25/hedge-funds-sue-to-get-argentine-bond-payment-in-london/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
N54P-2V6H].
80 Maximiliano Rizzi, Judge Orders New York Bank to Hold on to Argentine
Bonds, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2014, 8:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/07/usargentina-debt-idUSKBN0G702420140807#GuKuB2lHr7kUZTek.97 [http://perma.cc/T
CF5-HBH7].
73
74
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Mellon did not disperse the payments to the exchange creditors
by the July 31, 2014, due date.81
Meanwhile, Judge Griesa had placed a separate July 30,
2014, deadline on a settlement between the holdouts and
Argentina.82 A settlement was never reached because Argentina
refused to cooperate with the demands of the vulture funds—
primarily because it feared that its economy would collapse if
other vulture funds brought suit for the full value of the original
bonds.83 The failure to negotiate with the holdouts, combined with
the failure to pay the scheduled exchange payment, plunged
Argentina into a default on July 31, 2014.84 This marked the second
default in the country’s history in just 13 years, causing nearly $1
billion in credit-default swaps and complicating the holdout
litigation even further.85 By defaulting, Argentina expressed a clear
decision to the district court and the holdout funds: it would do
whatever it takes to avoid paying the vulture funds.
While Argentina’s default prevented the country from
paying the holdouts, it did so at the cost of causing Argentina to
fall behind on exchange bondholder payments for the first time
since the restructuring negotiations.86 In New York, Citibank, the
consumer division of Citigroup, appealed the injunction that
prevented it from processing a payment on bonds governed by
Argentine law due on September 30, 2014, arguing that it was not
bound by the injunctions aimed at New York law governed bonds.87
“The exchange bonds governed by Argentine law are denominated
in [both] U.S. dollars and in Argentine pesos,” but only the dollardenominated bonds were at issue in the Citibank case.88
Citibank feared that it would be subject to criminal
sanctions from Argentina for missing the scheduled interest
payment to exchange bondholders governed by local law.89 The
Second Circuit dismissed Citibank’s appeal for lack of
81 Kate Kelly, Bank of NY Mellon Informs Exchange Holders of Argentina’s
Default, CNBC (July 31, 2014, 8:33 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/07/31/bank-of-nymellon-informs-exchange-holders-of-argentinas-default.html [http://perma.cc/3EYP-RRPC].
82 Hartley, supra note 4.
83 Turner, Hedge Fund, supra note 75.
84 Hartley, supra note 4.
85 Kolhatkar, supra note 78.
86 Taos Turner, Argentina Deposits $161 Million Bond Payment Locally,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2014, 12:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/argentina-deposits161-million-bond-payment-locally-1412094626 [http://perma.cc/AZN6-X974] [hereinafter
Turner, Argentina Deposits].
87 Jeff Sistrunk, 2nd Circ. Tosses Citibank Appeal of Argentina Bond Ruling,
LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2014, 3:48 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/579292/2nd-circtosses-citibank-appeal-of-argentina-bond-ruling [http://perma.cc/6CWX-9JFE].
88 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 06978 (TPG), 2015
U.S. Dist. Lexis 30625, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2015).
89 Sistrunk, supra note 87.
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jurisdiction,90 and Citibank responded by requesting a hold on
the injunction.91 Surprisingly, Judge Griesa said Citibank could
process its regularly scheduled interest payment in order to
allow enough time for lawyers on both sides to present evidence
on whether future payments to exchange bondholders under
local law should be prevented.92
Despite the initially favorable ruling for Citibank, as of
December 2015, the case continues to be a bitter legal feud
between Argentina and the vulture funds.93 Judge Griesa refused
to allow a group of creditors to tap into the funds held by BNY
Mellon because the funds were located outside of the country, but
the potential for asset seizure was enough to provoke Argentina
into action.94 In an attempt to skirt these decisions, Argentina set
up a new plan. It first passed legislation permitting it to pay
restructured bondholders in Argentina rather than in New York.95
It then removed BNY Mellon as its indentured trustee and
replaced it with a local Argentine trustee, Nación Fideicomisos
S.A.96 Argentina subsequently made a $161 million deposit in
interest payments to the local trustee for issuance to the
restructured bondholders.97 This act of defiance directly violated
the injunction against Argentina that prevented it from making
payments to restructured bondholders without also making
ratable payments to holdouts. Quite predictably, this scheme to
continue local interest payments resulted in yet another
unfavorable ruling for Argentina.
C.

The Growth of the Battlefield and the Current Situation

As a result of Argentina’s scheme to remove BNY Mellon
as trustee and pay restructured bondholders under local law,
Id.
Nate Raymond, Citigroup to Seek Pause of Order Blocking Argentine Bond
Payment, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2014, 11:37 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
09/22/argentina-debt-citigroup-idUSL2N0RN0UH20140922 [http://perma.cc/ZC55-U44P].
92 Matt Day, U.S. Judge: Citibank May Make Interest Payment on Argentine
Bonds, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2014, 6:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-judgecitibank-may-make-interest-payment-on-argentine-bonds-1411770775 [http://perma.cc/
HM7X-33PC].
93 Rizzi, supra note 80.
94 Kurt Orzeck, BNY Doesn’t Have to Turn Over $539M to Argentina Creditors,
LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2014, 9:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/590925/bny-doesn-t-haveto-turn-over-539m-to-argentina-creditors [http://perma.cc/P3BS-MTDC].
95 Turner, Argentina Deposits, supra note 86.
96 Jorge Otaola, Argentina Defies U.S. Court Order by Depositing Debt Payment,
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2014, 8:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/01/us-argentinadebt-idUSKCN0HP1O820141001 [http://perma.cc/EMZ8-6AWY]; Turner, Argentina
Deposits, supra note 86.
97 Jorge Otaola, supra note 96; Turner, Argentina Deposits, supra note 86.
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Judge Griesa found Argentina in contempt of court.98 In
addition, Judge Griesa ordered the country to stop its attempts
at skirting his rulings and to reinstate BNY Mellon as its
indentured trustee.99 Argentina appealed the contempt decision
to the Second Circuit.100
Meanwhile, Judge Griesa held a March 3, 2015, hearing
on the issue of whether Citibank could continue to process
interest payments on exchange bonds governed by Argentine
law.101 On March 12, 2015, Judge Griesa ruled that Citibank
could not continue to make payments due on the U.S. dollardenominated bonds despite the fact that the bonds are governed
by Argentine law.102 Argentina subsequently threatened to revoke
Citibank’s operating license if it failed to process payments to
exchange bondholders.103 In response, Citibank announced its
intention to quit the local custody business in Argentina.104 Then,
on April 7, 2015, the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal of the
contempt ruling on the grounds that it was not the result of a
final judgment.105 Although the holdouts urged Judge Griesa to
fine Argentina $50,000 a day until it complied with his orders, no
such fine has been imposed.106
In an attempt to ease tensions created by his prior
Citibank ruling, Judge Griesa allowed Citibank to process
interest payments on the Argentine bonds due on March 31,

Turner, Argentina Deposits, supra note 86.
Jones Day Business Restructuring & Reorganizing Practice, Worldwide:
Sovereign Debt Update—November-December 2014, MONDAQ (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/359598/Human+Rights/Sovereign+Debt+Updat
e [http://perma.cc/U5UV-5D93].
100 Bob Van Voris & Phil Milford, Argentina Appeals New York Bond Judge’s
Contempt Finding, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 4, 2014, 7:31 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-11-04/argentina-appeals-new-york-bond-judge-s-contempt-finding-1-.html
[http://perma.cc/NN9M-BG4E].
101 Nate Raymond & Chris Reese, U.S. Judge Sets March Hearing Over Citi
Processing of Argentine Bond Payments, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2015, 5:19 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/06/us-argentina-debt-citigroup-idUSKBN0KF2402
0150106 [http://perma.cc/4T3F-28R9].
102 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 06978 (TPG), 2015
U.S. Dist. Lexis 30625 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2015).
103 Citibank Gets Stern Warning from Argentina that it Could Lose Banking
License, FOX NEWS LATINO (Mar. 14, 2015), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money
/2015/03/14/citibank-gets-stern-warning-from-argentina-that-it-could-lose-banking-license/
[http://perma.cc/YL2N-2GPK].
104 Richard Lough, Argentina Sues Citibank Over Deal with Holdout Creditors,
REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/08/us-argentinadebt-idUSKBN0MZ1RP20150408 [http://perma.cc/9LGB-8WZZ].
105 Y. Peter Kang, 2nd Circ. Nixes Argentina’s Contempt Appeal in Bond Row,
LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2015, 6:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/640474/2nd-circ-nixesargentina-s-contempt-appeal-in-bond-row [http://perma.cc/HS45-AM6X].
106 Van Voris & Milford, supra note 100.
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2015, and June 30, 2015.107 But Judge Griesa conditioned the
authorization of these payments on a stipulation between
Argentina’s holdout bondholders and Citibank that forbid
Citibank from appealing the NML Capital decision.108 After
Citibank accepted this deal and distributed the March 31
payment, Argentina brought suit against Citibank for striking
an allegedly illegal deal with the court.109 As part of this
rebellion against Citibank, an Argentine court upheld an
injunction ordering Citibank not to comply with the agreement
to cooperate with the holdouts and suspended the application of
the agreement.110 Citibank has since been suspended from
capital market operations in Argentina.111
This infectious legal battle also provoked creditors
outside of the United States to bring suit for repayment. In
Germany, two German investors have already succeeded in
obtaining favorable rulings against Argentina for full
repayment of their original bonds.112 In London, four U.K.
creditors joined suit against BNY Mellon, alleging that it put
its own interests in obeying the court before its fiduciary duty
as trustee to the exchange bondholders.113 The lawyer
representing these creditors argued that they were merely
“innocent third parties” to the conflict between Argentina and
the holdout creditors.114 The U.K. court initially delayed
deciding the case in the hopes that the pending U.S. disputes
would be resolved.115 Foreseeing that a wait-and-see approach
107 Anthony Esposito & David Goodman, U.S. Court Authorizes Citigroup to
Process Argentine Bond Payments, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2015/03/22/argentina-debt-citigroup-idUSL2N0WO0C420150322 [http://perma.cc/5N
VY-KXKE].
108 Lough, supra note 104.
109 Id.
110 Jerin Mathew, Argentine Court Suspends US Judge-Backed Agreement
Between Citibank and Vulture Funds, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 19, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/argentine-court-suspends-us-judge-backed-agreement-betweencitibank-vulture-funds-1501926 [http://perma.cc/94YN-YUXG].
111 Lough, supra note 104.
112 Pablo Kummetz, German Court to Rule on Argentina Bond Repayment
Terms, DW (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.dw.de/german-court-to-rule-on-argentina-bondrepayment-terms/a-18196207 [http://perma.cc/X4YL-QUHH].
113 Richard Lough & Walter Bianchi, Argentina’s Fernandez to Meet
Billionaire Investor Soros in New York, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2014, 10:38 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/22/us-argentina-debt-soros-idUSKCN0HH1ZI2
0140922 [http://perma.cc/GXL2-F2RF].
114 Mani, George Soros and Kyle Bass Battle It Out with Paul Singer in
London Court, VALUEWALK (Nov. 4, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/
11/george-soros-kyle-bass-argentina/ [http://perma.cc/Z4S5-FXCB].
115 U.K. Judge Delays Ruling on Order Sought by Argentina Creditors,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 6, 2014, 7:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201411-06/u-k-judge-delays-ruling-on-order-sought-by-argentina-creditors [http://perma.cc/36
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could end up being an indefinite stay, the U.K. court held on
February 13, 2015, that U.K. law, and not U.S. judicial rulings,
governs Argentine bonds issued under U.K. law.116 The U.K.
court refrained from making a decision with respect to BNY
Mellon’s obligations, however, due to the fact that BNY Mellon
was still severely limited by the U.S. injunction.117
Although NML Capital has continued to pursue debt
repayment in full force, the issue remains unresolved. NML
Capital previously filed a motion to compel subpoenas requiring
Argentina to disclose information about its assets that were
capable of being seized in order to satisfy Judge Griesa’s
judgment.118 The Second Circuit upheld Judge Griesa’s ruling,
ordering Argentina and 29 banks to provide information about
Argentina’s assets.119 Argentina subsequently refused to provide
documents and information about its U.S. assets.120 On August 12,
2015, Judge Griesa sanctioned Argentina for failing to produce
such documents and declared that any Argentine property located
within the United States, unless for diplomatic or military use, was
deemed “commercial.”121 Such a declaration makes it easier for
creditors to go after Argentina’s assets under the FSIA,122 but
despite this ruling, none of Argentina’s assets have yet to be
seized. It is fairly unlikely that Argentina will suddenly decide to
cooperate with the vultures by disclosing information about its
assets.123 Such cooperation is even more unlikely since the Second

116 Knighthead Master Fund LP v. The Bank of New York Mellon [2015]
EWHC270 (Ch); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Martin Guzman, A Fair Hearing for Sovereign
Debt, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/argentina-repay-vulture-fund-by-joseph-e--stiglitz-and-martin-guzman2015-03 [http://perma.cc/TEP4-G7YR].
117 Knighthead Master Fund, EWHC270, at 11.
118 Erik Larson & Chris Dolmetsch, Argentina Fails to Block Subpoenas Over
Assets in Bond Case, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 23, 2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-12-23/argentina-loses-appeal-to-quash-subpoenas-over-its-assets.html
[http://perma.cc/747M-KHP9].
119 U.S. Appeals Court Rules Against Argentina in Debt Case, LATIN AM.
HERALD TRIB., http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=2366765&CategoryId=14093
[http://perma.cc/E9BG-8CMD] (last visited Dec. 8, 2015).
120 Nate Raymond, UPDATE 1—U.S. Judge Sanctions Argentina in Debt Default
Litigation, REUTERS (Aug. 12, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/08/12/argentina-debt-idUSL1N10N2ZC20150812 [http://perma.cc/SBZ4-JEWW].
121 Bob Van Voris, Argentina Sanctioned for Failing to Turn Over Asset
Evidence, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 12, 2015, 4:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-08-12/nml-seeks-to-penalize-argentina-for-withholding-asset-evidence
[http://perma.cc/53YF-VWLQ].
122 Raymond, supra note 120.
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Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015, 4:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/
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Circuit recently ruled that bondholders couldn’t seize Argentina’s
central bank assets as payment for the bonds.124
In the wake of this dispute between Argentina and the
holdouts, the feared consequence—that Judge Griesa’s decision
has encouraged other creditors to emulate the success of NML
Capital—is becoming a reality.125 In late 2014, yet another
party brought suit against Argentina seeking full repayment of
its original bonds.126 Billionaire Kenneth Dart is a vulture
investor who, like NML Capital’s Paul Singer, has made a
living buying defaulted sovereign debt, only to bring suit later
in order to enforce repayment on the full value of the bonds.127
Dart remained quiet throughout the NML Capital battle but is
now seeking an order for full repayment.128
While the additional lawsuit is problematic in and of
itself given the lack of success in enforcing the injunctions,
Dart’s sudden emergence into the Argentine drama brings to
light an even more troubling reality: the bonds owned by the
five holdouts at the core of the NML Capital drama represent
only a quarter of the Argentine bonds governed by New York
law and held by holdout bondholders.129 These holdout
bondholders have since filed 36 separate lawsuits against
Argentina seeking full repayment of the bonds in order to profit
from Judge Griesa’s order.130 These new holdouts—termed “me
too” plaintiffs—seek an additional $5.4 billion from Argentina
before the country is permitted to make any payments on
restructured debt.131 On June 5, 2015, Judge Griesa granted
partial summary judgment to a group of 526 “me too”
plaintiffs.132 Argentina appealed the decision, and the Second

124 Erik Larson & Daniel Cancel, Argentine Bank Assets Can’t Be Seized by
Bondholders, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 31, 2015, 10:21 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
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Circuit has since reversed many of Judge Griesa’s additional
class certifications for these plaintiffs.133
As the saga continues between Argentina and the
holdouts, restructured bondholders and BNY Mellon, and the
intermediaries and the district court itself, some troublesome
issues have become apparent. Despite the creative attempt by
the court to force Argentina to pay back restructured
bondholders or face a default, Argentina has repeatedly refused
to cooperate. Given the very nature of an injunction against a
sovereign nation, it would not be surprising if Argentina simply
never paid back these holdout bondholders at all. Moreover,
Argentina will undoubtedly stop at nothing in order to continue
repaying those creditors who cooperated with them in the debt
restructuring and who are protected under the Lock Law aimed
at pressuring such cooperation. These factors, taken together,
will likely ensure that Argentina will never make payments to
the holdout bondholders.
Judge Griesa’s only remaining course of action is to
impose additional sanctions on Argentina for its defiance. But
these too will likely be ignored, considering that Argentina still
has not paid a $29 million sanction for violating a court order
imposed by the United States in 2000.134 While the U.S. district
court can continue to rule against Argentina, the nation will
appeal, it will defy, and it will not negotiate. Not only is this
course of action problematic for settling Argentina’s own debt
disputes, but it is also establishing a scheme for other nations
to permanently skirt the repayment of their creditors.
The vulture funds have also made it abundantly clear that
they “will ‘continue to enthusiastically pursue vigorous
enforcement of . . . [their] contractual rights, including following
the trail of Argentine assets wherever it leads.’”135 Despite the fact
that Argentina is attempting to pay back its debt (or at least its
restructured debt), emerge from the default, and once again
become a player in the international economy, the vulture funds
will stop at nothing to collect their profit on bonds they knew were
doomed from the start. The vulture funds take advantage of
foreign states when they are at their weakest by employing
investment strategies that are only possible because these
distressed foreign states lack bankruptcy protection.136 Now that
133 Nate Raymond, Argentina Urges U.S. Appeals Court to Toss Debt Class-Action
Ruling, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2015, 1:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/
08/21/argentina-debt-court-idUSL1N10W1IX20150821 [http://perma.cc/78S5-6494].
134 Van Voris & Milford, supra note 100.
135 Mani, supra note 114.
136 Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 23, at 49-50.
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these vulture funds have the courts on their side, it is difficult to
see a light at the end of the foreign debt restructuring tunnel. The
district court’s decision has created a prisoner’s dilemma, wherein
both sides have strong incentives to avoid cooperation. This in
turn encourages creditors to hold out from restructuring
agreements in order to sue in full.137
D.

Argentina, Puerto Rico, and Greece—Oh My

Despite the fact that vulture funds like NML Capital have
yet to collect on Argentina’s debt, this has not stopped many of
those same vulture funds from lining up to collect on other major
recent defaults in Puerto Rico and Greece.138 Greece became “the
first developed nation to default on an IMF loan” when it failed to
make a scheduled loan payment due on June 30, 2015.139
Although the Greek bonds included Collective Action Clauses
(CACs)—contractual clauses that make restructuring easier by
allowing a certain majority of bondholders to agree on
restructuring terms that bind all other bondholders—the
potential for holdout litigation still exists under any one of the 40
bilateral investment treaties Greece has signed with other
countries.140 The Greek financial crisis has led to major
consequences; its GDP fell by 29% between 2008 and 2014, and
its unemployment rate increased to 26.2% in 2014.141 Greece has
also seen an increase in homelessness, depression, and
suicides142—not to mention that its health system is on the brink
of collapse and access to health services has become increasingly
limited.143 If vulture funds are able to prolong Greece’s economic
recovery, humanitarian disaster could very well ensue.144
Puerto Rico also defaulted on its debt on August 3, 2015,
and a proposal has already been introduced to issue new bonds
Jrada, supra note 3, at 223-32.
Hedge Fund Vultures in Puerto Rico, HEDGECLIPPERS (July 10, 2015),
http://hedgeclippers.org/hedgepapers-no-17-hedge-fund-billionaires-in-puerto-rico/#_ftn4
[http://perma.cc/X454-6UKP].
139 John Geddie & Marius Zaharia, Greek Debt Better Shielded from Vultures than
Argentina’s, REUTERS (July 3, 2015, 8:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2015/
07/03/euro-zone-greece-vultures-idUSL8N0ZI23B20150703 [http://perma.cc/LEW5-CBKC];
Don Lee, Greek Debt Crisis: Athens not Alone on Sovereign Default, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (July 8, 2015, 5:43 PM), http://www.smh.com.au/world/greek-debt-crisis-athens-notalone-on-sovereign-default-20150708-gi7ned.html [http://perma.cc/T8VS-84M6].
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with more favorable terms to bondholders.145 It is probable,
however, that the major U.S. firms and banks will hold out
against Puerto Rico in the federal courts.146 Based on the
precedent set by NML Capital, these holdouts will likely win
these cases.147 Creditors will be discouraged from participating
in future debt restructuring initiatives if vulture funds
continue to win cases against sovereign debtors.148 Time is of
the essence, however, as Puerto Rico has already experienced
skyrocketing energy costs, devastation to its infrastructure,
and a middle class that is abandoning ship in the hopes of
finding a more stable economy.149 The long-term consequences
of Puerto Rico’s default are innumerable.
These recent defaults have brought the many failures of
the Argentine restructuring back into the spotlight, making
debt restructuring a less appealing remedy for an economically
struggling sovereign. As the Argentine debt saga continues to
unfold, it appears increasingly clear that a drastic change in
sovereign foreign debt restructuring must be made in order to
prevent similar situations from occurring in the future. In the
wake of Argentina’s default, the United Nations Human Rights
Council passed a resolution advocating for an international
legal framework designed to regulate the restructuring of
sovereign debt in a way that protects sovereigns from vulture
fund litigation.150 In support of the resolution, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development created the Ad
Hoc Committee on Sovereign Debt Restructuring.151 In late
July 2015, the Committee unanimously adopted nine new
principles aimed at increasing good faith negotiations,
transparency, impartiality, equitable treatment, sovereign
immunity, legitimacy, and sustainability in the global

145 Carlos Marichal, After the Default: A Neoliberal Debt Solution for Puerto Rico,
NACLA (Aug. 18, 2015), https://nacla.org/news/2015/08/18/after-default-neoliberal-debtsolution-puerto-rico [http://perma.cc/K755-GYGL].
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151 Ad Hoc Committee on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes, J. United
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marketplace.152 This is certainly a step in the right direction
towards implementing a new restructuring mechanism, but
more than general principles are needed to bring about
significant changes in the international debt arena.
There are roughly $900 billion worth of outstanding
international sovereign bonds—none of which would be subject
to the new principles endorsed by the United Nations.153
Meanwhile, the Argentine holdouts are setting an example for
creditors on how to prevent further effective restructuring.
Previous proposed solutions to debt restructuring have
highlighted the need for change, but each is riddled with its own
issues. The inherent problems of the three main proposals,
however, shed light on a potential solution that is better
equipped to facilitate successful restructuring with both new
and existing sovereign bonds.
II.

THE THREE MAIN PROPOSALS AND THEIR DEFICIENCIES

In recent decades, three main scholarly proposals for
alleviating holdout litigation and reforming foreign debt
restructuring practices have emerged. Unfortunately, no one of
these proposals is perfect, as each one contains inherent
inadequacies that prove fatal to resolving the problem of holdout
litigation and foreign debt restructuring. By examining the
benefits present in each of the three proposals, however, a
potential solution to foreign debt restructuring emerges.
A.

Judicial Reform: An International Certification Board

One solution for facilitating successful debt restructurings,
proposed by University of Michigan Law School Professor John E.
Pottow, is the establishment of an international certification
board.154 The purpose of such a board would be to create a neutral
global forum in which to address issues in the international
monetary and financial system.155 As far as restructuring goes,
152 United Nations Lays Down Clear Principles in Tackling Sovereign Debt,
UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV. (July 29, 2015), http://unctad.org/en/pages/
newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1047 [http://perma.cc/5GAD-SR5G].
153 IMF, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action
Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, at 33 (Oct. 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/
np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf [http://perma.cc/8HNL-BGQ9] [hereinafter IMF, Strengthening
the Contractual Framework].
154 See, e.g., Pottow, supra note 67, at 236; BERTRAND COUILLAULT & PIERREFRANÇOIS WEBER, BANQUE DE FRANCE, TOWARDS A VOLUNTARY CODE OF GOOD
CONDUCT FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2003).
155 Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations
General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System 90-91
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the board would essentially be required to approve a sovereign’s
restructuring plan prior to the proposal of such plan to
bondholders.156 The board would look to international law customs
to determine whether the plan ensures procedural fairness and
protects bondholder interests.157
In theory, an international certification board would help
combat holdout problems by providing formal approval of
restructuring proposals.158 But in application, the board’s
decision would still be nonbinding. “[T]he chief role the Board
could play is that its nonbonding declarations of restructuring
proposals . . . with generally fair treatment of creditors could then
be relied . . . [on] by nonexpert, generalist judges who might be
called upon to exercise judicial discretion.”159 Thus, the board would
have no authority to force compliance, punish noncompliance, or
resolve disputes over bond proprieties—the very issues Argentina
experiences.160 Moreover, the board would have no power to
condition plan approval on a sovereign’s passage of austerity
measures to improve economic policies.161 An international
certification board would effectively do nothing to help correct the
underlying problems in a sovereign’s economic structure.
Further, the board’s disciplinary influence would be
limited to inflicting reputational damage, rendering it
essentially “toothless.”162 Vulture funds do not respond to
reputational pressures.163 They seek the highest immediate
return on investment, regardless of the effects on their
relationships with debtors or other investors.164 As the vulture
funds in the Argentine litigation have demonstrated, the
criticisms and pressures of international financial institutions
(Sept.
21,
2009),
http://www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/docs/FinalReport_CoE.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TRU8-Y495].
156 Pottow, supra note 67, at 236.
157 Id.
158 See generally Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. 1026) (discussing the loan approval process for the Organization of
Management and Budget under the Truth in Lending Act); Pottow, supra note 67, at 222.
159 Pottow, supra note 67, at 237 (emphasis added).
160 Id. at 236; see also Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black
Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured? 812 (Apr. 2, 2003),
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/PDFS/Inside_Black_Box.pdf [http://perma.cc/
ZU99-7XRC] (unpublished manuscript) (questioning whether an international
restructuring court would have sufficient authority to bind sovereign debtors to a debt
restructuring process).
161 See generally Pottow, supra note 67, at 236 (describing the various
limitations on an international restructuring board’s power).
162 Id. at 236, 242; Bolton & Skeel, supra note 160, at 812.
163 Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1090 (2004).
164 Id.

290

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

do not sway holdouts.165 This would leave the board effectively
incapable of exerting any influence over these vulture funds.
More importantly, one of the biggest current problems
in sovereign debt default, highlighted by the situation in
Argentina, is that a sovereign can simply refuse to pay its
debts.166 An international certification board could not force a
stubborn sovereign to repay its “board approved” debt.167 And
absent some legally binding standards to enforce and punish,
an international certification board could also do nothing to
subside the contentious holdout litigators or their equally
contentious sovereign opponents, which is currently the largest
issue facing foreign sovereign debt.
B.

Statutory Reform: The “Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism”

In 2001, the IMF proposed a statutory framework for
addressing the weaknesses in sovereign debt restructuring: the
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).168 The SDRM
proposes a framework for a majority of creditors to bind all
bondholders regarding critical decisions on the restructuring
terms of their bond contracts.169 The SDRM has three main
features.170 First, it proposes the aggregation of all claims related
to the same sovereign debt despite different instruments and
issuances.171 Second, SDRM provisions would apply to all existing
claims at the time of the restructuring proposal.172 Third, SDRM
features would bind all judgment creditors and would not be
limited to contractual claims.173
The SDRM is riddled with substantial limitations that
minimize its possible impact on restructuring issues. The
SDRM’s legal framework aims to make the restructuring
process more efficient and predictable by imposing sanctions on
Id.
Pottow, supra note 67, at 238; Jrada, supra note 3, at 230.
167 Pottow, supra note 67, at 236.
168 See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., IMF, International Financial
Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address at the
National
Economists’
Club
Annual
Members’
Dinner
(Nov.
26,
2001),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm [http://perma.cc/UNS4-P6LH];
IMF, Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Feb. 2003),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M77N-ZFZ4]
[hereinafter Proposed Features].
169 See Proposed Features, supra note 168; Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal
Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 336 (2005).
170 Hagan, supra note 169, at 336.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
165
166
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all violators of the statute.174 After its proposal, however, the
SDRM received much criticism, and in particular, the United
States strongly disapproved of it in favor of a more marketbased solution, such as contractual reform.175 The SDRM also
creates issues of fairness in intercreditor negotiations.176 It does
not provide for formal negotiation procedures for majority and
minority creditors, which raises questions of accountability
when, for instance, a bank is representing a minority of
bondholders.177 This is because a bank tasked with representing
the interests of all bondholders equally would have to balance
pressure from majority shareholders with the interests of
minority shareholders.178
The IMF originally predicted that the SDRM would reduce
the costs associated with restructuring by decreasing undue
delays to the restructuring process, but the opposite is more
likely.179 The IMF argued that it would be better equipped to
resist pressures to provide financial packages to sovereigns with
unstable debt, knowing that a reliable statutory mechanism for
restructuring existed.180 In turn, sovereigns aware of the IMF’s
decreased financing susceptibility would be more willing to start
restructuring negotiations earlier, which would encourage
restructuring prior to default.181 Conversely, uncertainties about
the implementation and operation of the SDRM would likely
lower the price of outstanding sovereign debt, which would deter
the SDRM’s enactment.182 Costs would also remain high for the
sovereign, especially when banks hold a majority of its debt.183
This would effectively prevent sovereigns from initiating
restructuring agreements before it was absolutely necessary.
The largest limitation on the IMF’s argument for the
SDRM is that, ultimately, its effectiveness would depend entirely
on the sovereign’s policies.184 The SDRM does nothing to remedy
174 Commentators have recognized that a more organized and financially efficient
restructuring framework could ease the financial burden on the IMF. See, e.g., GROUP OF 30,
KEY ISSUES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2002); Kenneth Rogoff, Emerging Market
Debt. What Is the Problem?, Speech at the IMF Sovereign Debt Restructuring Conference
(Jan. 22, 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/012203a.htm [http://perma.cc/
G6V6-UX5C].
175 Auray, supra note 8, at 917.
176 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 163, at 1096.
177 Id. at 1096-97.
178 Id.
179 Hagan, supra note 169, at 338.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 339.
182 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 163, at 1097.
183 Hagan, supra note 169, at 340; BRAD SETSER, IPD TASK FORCE ON SOVEREIGN
DEBT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SDRM 5 (2008).
184 Hagan, supra note 169, at 340; SETSER, supra note 183, at 10-11.
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the underlying issues in the sovereign’s economic policies, which
are the very policies that contributed to the sovereign’s distressed
debt burden in the first place.185 Thus, “[n]o matter how effective
the collective action mechanism, creditors would not be willing to
agree to a restructuring unless and until the sovereign had
formulated . . . [a] framework that would provide adequate
assurance that the country would be able to repay the
restructured claims.”186 Instead, the SDRM may actually make it
more difficult for sovereigns to pay back debts and start fresh.187
C.

Contractual Reform: Collective Action Clauses

The contractual mechanism is currently the most
commonly used device for combating restructuring issues.188 The
contractual proposal advocates for a free-market approach that
provides more complete debt restructuring contracts by inserting
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in bond agreements.189 Bonds
under English law have included CACs for over 100 years, but
CACs were not added to New York bonds until 2003.190
There are two basic types of CACs.191 The first is the
majority restructuring provision, which is a clause that allows for
a certain majority of bondholders to bind all other bondholders to
the terms of a restructuring negotiation by a majority vote.192 The
second is the majority enforcement provision, which enables a
certain majority of bondholders to vote on a separate
restructuring agreement that governs the voting majority without
disrupting the restructuring process for the minority
bondholders.193 In the foreign debt context, CACs are generally
used to allow a supermajority (commonly 75%) of bondholders to
require all bondholders of the same bonds to comply with the
terms of the agreed-upon restructuring agreement.194
At first glance, CACs appear to be a perfect solution to the
holdout problem, but they do not do enough to solve current and

Hagan, supra note 169, at 340; SETSER, supra note 183, at 11.
Hagan, supra note 169, at 340.
187 SETSER, supra note 183, at 5-6.
188 Auray, supra note 8, at 918.
189 Stephan Airapetian, Note, Managing Sovereign Debt: A More Long-Term
Debt-Restructuring Solution, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 385, 394 (2013).
190 Auray, supra note 8, at 918.
191 Id.
192 Hagan, supra note 169, at 317.
193 Auray, supra note 8, at 918-19.
194 See IMF, The Design and Effectiveness of Collective Action Clauses, at 5
(June 6, 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602.pdf [http://perma.cc/
TVX5-N66V]; Hagan, supra note 169, at 317.
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future restructuring issues.195 These contractual provisions are
designed to prevent the possibility of holdout litigation by binding
all bondholders to the restructuring agreement.196 But CACs only
bind bondholders within the same issuance, which leaves open
the possibility that holdouts could obtain a supermajority in any
particular issuance and block the intended operation of the
CAC.197 Recent proposals for contractual changes aim to solve
these discrepancies by including aggregation clauses that would
allow all majority decisions to bind holders of the same bond
across multiple issuances.198
These aggregation provisions are also flawed, because if
disputes about the agreed-upon voting provisions arise between
bondholders, they would likely be hailed into different courts that
could use different interpretations of the clauses.199 Further, if
just one issuance of a particular country’s bonds omitted the
aggregation clause, that particular issuance could give rise to
holdout litigation, which would frustrate the entire restructuring
process. These flaws prevent CACs from effectively safeguarding
against the holdout problem, as is the case in Greece, where the
use of CACs did not prevent holdout litigation.200
Even more problematic is the fact that CACs are merely
contractual terms. CACs are designed to safeguard against the
possibility that a sovereign will pressure bondholders to agree
to certain conditions that benefit the sovereign.201 By giving
bondholders control over the restructuring process, CACs are
supposed to ensure that sovereigns will not restructure only to
never actually pay back the debt.202 But CACs are not binding,
and debtors are not bound to include such language in their
contracts.203 For instance, some sovereign creditors embrace the
See, e.g., Pottow, supra note 67, at 224.
Auray, supra note 8, at 918.
197 Hagan, supra note 169, at 320-21; see also Bolton & Skeel, supra note 160
(describing how the requirement of a supermajority could actually result in less
protection for bondholders).
198 See INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASS’N, STANDARD AGGREGATED COLLECTIVE
ACTION CLAUSES (“CACS”) FOR THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SOVEREIGN NOTES 5
(Aug. 2014), http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Resources/ICMA-StandardCACs-August-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/H9CA-2VKU]; IMF, Strengthening the
Contractual Framework, supra note 153.
199 Hagan, supra note 169, at 320; Patrick Bolton, Toward a Statutory
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice
Around the World (IMF Working Paper, No. 03/13, 2003), http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0313.pdf [http://perma.cc/8VFY-U5DN].
200 See
IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring—Recent Developments and
Implications for the Funds Legal and Policy Framework, at 28 (Apr. 2013),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf [http://perma.cc/L8SY-9Y5X].
201 Auray, supra note 8, at 919.
202 Id.
203 See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 163, at 1110.
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possibility of holdout litigation in the restructuring process
because they believe it can help thwart strategic and
unnecessary defaults and restructuring agreements.204 These
creditors could simply opt not to include such provisions in
their contracts, which would cause inconsistencies in the
application of this contractual solution.205
Even if sovereign debtors choose to adopt the modified
terms as proposed by the IMF and other institutions, the
modification will likely be a lengthy process.206 Disagreements on
what particular provisions should be included could delay
modification.207 The costs associated with drafting and marketing
the new terms for the sovereign bonds may also deter the
adoption of new CACs.208 Unlike a statutory mechanism, the
implementation of which would only create legal costs associated
with the drafting of one uniform code, CACs would need to be
inserted into every single bond contract. The incremental nature
of contract reform inherently fails to provide an efficient and
comprehensive solution to the volatile debt market.209
Most importantly, CACs cannot be applied retroactively,
so pre-CAC issuances, like the ones Argentina issued throughout
the 1990s and early 2000s, would still pose a serious threat of
holdout litigation.210 Despite these flaws, proponents of the freemarket approach still assert that contractual mechanisms are the
best solution for sovereign restructuring problems.211 For
example, the Second Circuit noted that “[c]ollective action clauses
have been included in 99% of the aggregate value of New Yorklaw bonds issued since January 2005.”212
But as the Argentine saga has shown, this is clearly not
the case. Not only have CACs proved inefficient at preventing
holdout litigation when the bonds at issue actually included the
contractual provisions,213 other holdouts have now followed suit
and pursued litigation against sovereign creditors.214 Without a
See, e.g., id.
Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See id.; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 347, 359-62 (1996).
209 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 163, at 1110-11.
210 Pottow, supra note 67, at 224-25.
211 Auray, supra note 8, at 935-36.
212 COMM. ON FOREIGN & COM. L., N.Y.C. BAR, GOVERNING LAW IN
SOVEREIGN DEBT—LESSONS FROM THE GREEK DISPUTE OF 2012, at 14 (2013),
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072390-GoverningLawinSovereignDebt.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YX5N-P3LN].
213 Id. at 10-11.
214 Trindle, supra note 44.
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binding international resolution to replace the current contractual
mechanisms, CACs will continue to be ineffective at preventing
future holdout litigation a la the Argentine debt crisis.215
III.

AN INTERNATIONAL RESTRUCTURING REGIME

While there are many positive elements present in the
three main proposals, the flaws in each prove fatal to solving
the issues inherent in sovereign debt restructuring. By taking
the positive elements of each of the existing proposals and also
including provisions from the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a new,
fourth proposal could provide the solution to the growing issues
in sovereign debt restructuring. Although this solution contains
its own shortcomings, the many advantages of this hybrid
proposal outweigh any weaknesses, and it ultimately provides
the best mechanism for preventing sovereigns from behaving
like Argentina and skirting their debt obligations.
A.

An International Restructuring Code and Court

A statutory solution presents an ideal model for binding
sovereigns and bondholders to an efficient and successful
restructuring negotiation. The following are some suggested
provisions that could be incorporated into a larger international
debt statute—or left alone as a narrow restructuring code. At its
core, the international restructuring code would be a statutory
version of a majority restructuring clause that would allow a 75%
majority vote of bondholders to bind all other bondholders of the
same bonds to the terms of the agreed-upon restructuring
contract.216 This section would be based on the CACs and the
SDRM majority restructuring provisions.217 The code would
mirror the SDRM by incorporating aggregation clauses that
would combine all claims related to the same sovereign debt,
despite different instruments and issuances.218 The code would
also be applied to all existing claims at the time of the
restructuring proposal, which would help combat issues
associated with existing sovereign debt.219
Unlike CACs and the SDRM, however, if a
supermajority does not reach an agreement for a restructuring
plan, but a minority of bondholders do agree on a restructuring
215
216
217
218
219
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plan, then those minority bondholders may still agree to that
plan. If this occurs, holdout creditors would not be permitted to
bring collection actions for the value of their outstanding bonds
until after restructured creditors are paid under a certified
repayment plan.220 This provision would be modeled loosely on
Chapter 5 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which forbids a
creditor who has won a portion of his claim in a foreign
proceeding from receiving any payment until after domestic
creditors are paid equally.221
The greatest difference between all three previous
proposals and the international restructuring regime is that this
proposed provision would have a filtering mechanism to
determine the need for restructuring before approving any
restructuring plan.222 The filtering provision would ensure that
the sovereign attempting to restructure had a legitimate need to
restructure before considering a restructuring plan. This
“gatekeeper” provision could be modeled on Chapter 9 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, which requires a good faith need to
restructure.223 The United Nations acknowledged the importance
of not only good faith engagement between creditors and debtors,
but also transparency, fairness, and equal treatment as best
practices in debt restructuring agreements.224
These features are similar to Chapters 9 and 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, making U.S. law a preferable starting point for
designing an international code.225 Moreover, U.S. bankruptcy law
is largely governed by statute, whereas the United Kingdom tends
to rely more on contractual mechanisms, other European countries
rely heavily on court involvement, and many Asian and Latin
American countries utilize U.S. law as a model for their own
bankruptcy laws.226 Although the good faith requirement would be
an easy standard to meet,227 it would at least prevent a sovereign’s
blatant attempts to prolong repayment despite having adequate
funds. It would also protect bondholders by preventing sovereigns
from frivolously restructuring to avoid repayment.
The approval of the proposed restructuring plan would
also be conditioned on the debtor government passing austerity
measures aimed at solving the original problems that caused the
220 See Pottow, supra note 67, at 238 (suggesting that a judge could take an
innovative tool from bankruptcy law to adopt a reverse injunction against holdouts).
221 See 11 U.S.C. § 508 (2012).
222 Hagan, supra note 169, at 342.
223 See 11 U.S.C. § 921(c).
224 UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., supra note 152.
225 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 921(c), 1126.
226 Bolton, supra note 199, at 13-17.
227 Pottow, supra note 67, at 241.
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country to default (or come close to default) in the first place. This
condition would allow the creditors to maintain control over the
restructuring process, which would prevent the debtor from
enacting unfavorable terms. This “take it or leave it” approach
would pressure debtors to assent and would prevent sovereigns
from entering into restructuring contracts that they have no
intention of paying back.228
A possible enforcement agency could be an international
debtors commission similar to the international boards proposed
by Professor Pottow.229 This commission would not be powerless,
however, because it would have the authority to approve austerity
measures and restructuring plans, enforce the international
restructuring code, and punish violators. The court would have
limited jurisdiction and specialized knowledge, much like the
courts in the U.S. bankruptcy system. As a result, this would
increase the efficiency and success of sovereign debt restructuring
packages because neutral experts would scrupulously consider
the particular terms of each agreement. Additionally, austerity
measures would be imposed on a case-by-case basis so as to tailor
the agreements to the exact needs of the sovereign state and the
interested creditors.
Allowing an international bankruptcy court to determine
and enforce austerity measures in restructuring agreements is
also a better alternative to having an institution like the IMF
handle both predefault bailout packages and postdefault
restructuring agreements. While the IMF imposes austerity
measures as a condition of the use of bailout packages before a
country defaults, the IMF framework is not always perfect.230 In
fact, many blame the IMF for Argentina’s 2001 default because
the bailout packages lent too much money based on predicted
GDP growth that never occurred and unsustainable neoliberal
reforms that were never enforced.231 Overall, an international
restructuring court that handles postdefault restructuring would
provide for an efficient debt repayment process. By allowing the
sovereign to negotiate with its own bondholders, the international
restructuring court would allow it to reform and reemerge from
debt back into the international market. Thus, this proposed
court would create a balance between autonomy and oversight by
allowing the sovereign to negotiate with its own bondholders
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while also maintaining the ability to prevent a sovereign from
going off the rails as Argentina did.
B.

Advantages of a Hybrid Solution

Sovereign nations may be reluctant to embrace an
international court that facilitates sovereign debt restructurings,
but it is likely that the neutral forum such a court would provide
would create an incentive for countries to litigate there. For
current bondholders, doing so would require the sovereign to
enact legislation subjecting their existing bonds to the court’s
jurisdiction rather than New York or English law. Unlike
Argentina’s attempt at circumventing the U.S. district court’s
injunctions, these enactments would be perfectly legal since they
would not equate to defiance of court orders. Once agreed to, the
international arena could avoid the jurisdiction and venue issues
that are currently so common in international debt litigation.
Most importantly, the court would increase the legitimacy
of restructuring agreements by using legal sanctions and official
oversight that are lacking in contractual processes.232 While
immunity doctrines like the FSIA place states and their assets
outside the scope of judicial review unless the state waives or falls
under an exception to immunity,233 the proposed code and court
would not be subject to the provisions of the FSIA because it
would not be bound by U.S. law. This would leave the court free to
create its own, possibly less restrictive immunity policy that could
be adjusted on a case-by-case basis. Although designing and
implementing such a code and corresponding court could be a
lengthy process, the creation of a statutory regime with the ability
to effectively regulate sovereign debt restructuring will be well
worth it in the long run.
Once organized, an international debt restructuring
regime creates a negotiation structure for modifying bond
contracts in an orderly, legitimate process that prevents the
prolongation of sovereign debt issues.234 The legal framework
established by the international restructuring regime, like the
proposed SDRM, would make the restructuring process more
efficient and predictable by imposing sanctions on all violators of
the statute.235 In the end, this process would reduce the
inconsistencies of ad hoc decisions made by debt-distressed
232 Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign
Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 936 (2012).
233 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1967, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006).
234 Gelpern, supra note 232, at 935.
235 Id. at 936.
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sovereigns.236 It would similarly reduce the problems of
unplanned restructuring reform, which provides for toothless
remedies incapable of binding sovereigns and bondholders into an
equal and successful restructuring agreement. Moreover, this
regime encourages restructurings to take place prior to defaults,
thereby protecting valuable assets and limiting the economic and
social damage that results from a default. In this respect, Chapter
11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is a strong model, since it
provides for insolvency proceedings in which debtors and creditors
can negotiate.237 Ultimately, the proposed international court and
code would facilitate successful restructuring and prevent future
sovereign debt issues by helping to correct the underlying
economic issues in the particular sovereign’s economic regime.
CONCLUSION
Argentina’s second default and the ensuing litigation have
brought to light serious issues in the current sovereign debt
restructuring process, such as prolonged debt litigation, hostile
negotiations between creditors and debtors, and unsuccessful
restructuring arrangements. An international restructuring court
that enforces an international restructuring code is a viable
solution to these ever-increasing problems in restructuring
litigation. While there is a plethora of scholarly proposals that
range from statutory to contractual, none have suggested an
effective solution to the problems of foreign debt restructuring.238
Most scholars have considered individual proposals in isolation
from, and in opposition to, the other proposed solutions to the
restructuring problem.239
A combination of all three proposals’ benefits produces a
new and preferable “super-proposal.” This proposal avoids many
of the issues associated with CACs, the SDRM, and an
international certification board. It would also prevent unnecessary
restructuring by implementing a filtering provision that would
require a showing of a good faith need to restructure. Most
importantly, this solution would attempt to put a sovereign debtor
on a path to economic stability by conditioning restructuring on the
passing of certain austerity measures determined on a case-by-case
Id. at 937.
Hagan, supra note 169, at 339.
238 See generally Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Debt Restructurings 19502010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts (IMF, Working Paper No. 12/203,
2012) (outlining comprehensive analysis of all major sovereign debt issues and
proposals throughout a 60-year period).
239 Id.
236
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basis by the specialized court. This in turn would reduce the
heavy debt burden placed on many economically distressed
nations in the long term.
Although additional action is currently being taken by
the IMF to reform bond contracts in order to prevent collective
action problems,240 this alone is not enough to put a dent in the
issues resulting from a sovereign default on international debt.
Major reform must be undertaken to prevent future holdout
litigation on existing bonds and ensure that new bonds are also
protected from the possibility of indefinite holdouts. While “the
international realm has long countenanced degrees of hardness
in legal reforms,” the increasing litigation, hostility, and
inefficiency of the Argentine debt restructuring process have
illuminated the fact that times are changing.241
International institutions themselves are now calling for
drastic reform in order to combat holdout issues and prevent the
possibility of catastrophic consequences in the international
market.242 If a legally enforceable remedy binding all international
debtors to comply with an efficient restructuring plan is not
instituted soon, sovereign debt will remain just that: sovereign.
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